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This paper examines how a company may successfully walk out of a diworsefication situation: 
stage in which a brand has excessively overdiversified over new extensions, to the point it got 
weaker and its performance started failing. The study explains why companies enter a failing 
stage, particularly, mature companies which desperately search for innovation. It also 
concludes that several internal and external factors may lead a company to extend its business 
and that the idea of leveraging brand awareness and reputation, and spreading business risk 
over products may be appealing for a company to enter new markets. Yet, hidden costs, the 
possibility of a bad reputation on the parent brand, and extreme deviation from the core 
business may lead a brand to become lost, distracted, failing and losing money due to 
overstretching. Thus, this study provides guidance on when to stop diversifying and how to do 
it. The presented recovery strategies are content-orientated and process-orientated. The first 
includes cost efficiencies, asset retrenchment, focus on the core activities and build for the 
future. The latter involves reinvigoration of firm leadership and culture change. To better 
understand these concepts, this paper uses LEGO’s case as a real-life example of a success 
story of a company which almost went bankrupt due to a blind chase after a brand extension 
strategy. Fortunately, the Danish company turned around mostly thanks to a fierce cut on 






Este estudo explora como uma empresa é capaz de sair com sucesso de uma situação de 
diworsification, termo derivado do inglês diverse + worse: estado que uma marca atinge após 
ter extendido excessivamente a sua oferta de productos e serviços, tendo por isso ficado mais 
fraca e com uma pior performance. Este estudo explica o que leva a performance das empresas 
a falhar, particularmente, empresas amadurecidas que procuram inovar-se. Esta tese conclui 
que são muitos os motivos externos e internos que levam uma empres a extender o seu negócio, 
e que a possibilidade de obter maior reconhecimento e de repartir o risco da marca por vários 
produtos  alicia qualquer empresa a explorar novos mercados. Contudo, os custos escondidos 
destas extensões, e a possibilidade de deteriorização da marca e de que esta desvie o seu foco 
do negócio principal e se distraia, podem levar ao seu falhanço. Assim, este estudo apresenta 
várias estratégias de recuperação, nomeadamente estratégias de conteúdo e de processo. A 
primeira inclui eficiências de custos, foco nas atividades principais da empresa, e construção 
para o futuro. A segunda inclui uma liderança firme e cultura de mudança. Para melhor 
compreender estes conceitos, este estudo usa a LEGO como exemplo prático de uma empresa 
que saiu com sucesso de uma situação de quase falência, devido a uma estratégia desmedida 
de extensão de marca. Felizmente, a empresa Dinamarquesa, conseguiu dar a volta cortando 
extensões que apenas davam prejuízo, e adoptando uma estratégia de focalização no producto 
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In the financial year of 2013, LEGO, the well-known Danish construction toys’ 
company, announced record results. Its revenues increased by 10% to €3.4 billion. Profits 
before tax reached € 1.1 billion (figure 1). Revenues had tripled in eight years, and LEGO 
replaced Hasbro in becoming the second largest toy company in the world, following the giant 
Mattel. Yet, ten years earlier, LEGO was believed to have lost its focus, wandering around 
businesses other than its core one. The company was about to go bankrupt. In 2003, its net sales 
suffered an overall decline of 26% and inventory jumped by 40% at some outlets. Among many 
other unsatisfactory financial results, it also presented a pre-tax loss on earnings of € 188 
million, a drop of € 268 million compared to 2002. Back then, LEGO was reported the 
following way: “We are on a burning platform, losing money with negative cash flow and a 
real risk of debt default which could lead us to break up of the company” (figure 2) (Ashcroft, 
2013).  
The problem under analysis in this thesis is business failure due to brands’ 
overextensions, hereby defined as diworsefication.  Using Lego as the case under analysis, this 
thesis aims at impacting both the academic and the managerial world. On the one hand, it 
gathers literature on business performance failure, on the field of brand extensions, highlighting 
its pros and cons, and supporting methodical strategies for businesses to get out of a 
diworsefication situation. On the other hand, this study adds to the managerial world by helping 
companies identifying their failure process, allowing them to prevent it, handle it, or not repeat 
it. Also, this study suggests several reasons for which it would be interesting to bet on brand 
extensions, while it also refers some downsides. Ultimately, this thesis may be considered a 
guide for managers of companies with an overstretched brand portfolio, and that now aim to 
get up and refocus on the core business.  
This thesis presents literature on the following four research questions: “Why was Lego 
performance failing?”, “What drives a company to diversify its product range?”, “How can a 
brand extension strategy negatively impact a company?”, and “How may a company get out of 
a diworsefication situation?”. Then, it presents LEGO’s case study, going deeper on the before 
and after LEGO’s 2003 crisis. Also, this paper includes teaching notes, where it couples Lego’s 
7 
 
case to theory, presenting learning objectives, preparation questions, a roadmap for discussion, 

















This chapter is dedicated to the study of the research questions mentioned before. It 
will be divided in four section, each to address each question. 
 
Research Question 1: Why was LEGO performance failing? 
According to Sharma and Mahajan, an enterprise has multiple responsibilities. It must 
achieve certain market performance results, such as sales volume, sales growth, competitive 
market share, and strength of market position. It also has to produce certain financial 
performance indicators, such as profitability, growth, and liquidity. And, finally, it also has to 
achieve certain performance results in what concern stakeholders’ (for instance: employees, 
suppliers, the community) interests, such as employment stability and advancement, 
creditworthiness, and corporate citizenship. If the firm at stake cannot meet one or more of its 
responsibilities, it is failing (Sharma & Mahajan, 1980).  
To better understand the process of deterioration of a firm, Ooghe & De Prijcker suggest a 
conceptual failure model in which the lack of success of a company may be attributed to five 
main factors - variables emanating from outside the business and beyond the control of 
managers: general environment (external causes, such as economics, technology, foreign 
countries, politics, and social surroundings), immediate environment (interactions between 
the company and its stakeholders: customers, suppliers, competitors, banks and credit 
institutions, and stockholders), and company’s characteristics (features such as lifecycle 
stage, size, and the industry in which it operates); and, variables emerging from inside the firm 
and from which the firm can take advantage of: management of the company (qualities, 
motivation, personal characteristics, and skills of managers), and corporate policy of the 
enterprise (strategy and investments of the enterprise, its commercial and operational 
components, personnel, finance, and administration, and also the overall corporate governance 
of the company) (figure 3). (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008). 
 
Ooghe & De Prijcker (2008) described the existence of four types of failure processes, 
based on the company’s maturity and causes of bankruptcy, the ultimate consequence of 
failure. Processes were named the following away: the unsuccessful start-up (figure 4); the 
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ambitious growth company (figure 5); the dazzled growth company (figure 6); and the 
apathetic established company (figure 7). The first, second and fourth concern, respectively, 
companies which fail within five years of their inception, companies in their growth stage, and 
companies that fail after a lukewarm existence due to apathy and lack of commitment and 
motivation from management, falling outside of the scope of the project and therefore will not 
be address in the thesis. Then, Ooghe & De Prijcker (2008) presents the dazzled growth 
company, which is the term used to describe firms which fail at the mature stage of their 
lifecycle, and are therefore of utmost relevance for the purpose of this thesis. 
Dazzled growth companies are usually at a more mature stage of their life cycle, and 
so, their failure process usually starts with the desire for growth, to innovate and to bring 
something new to the company. A new strategy is developed, often involving an innovative 
product or process launch. The initial reaction of the manager to the new strategy is to become 
over-optimistic and confident about the results of the new projects. Later on, the growth and 
capital expenditures increase together with leverage, yet pitfalls are ignored and the 
organizational structures remain almost untouched. Consequently, it will not take it long for 
the company to start losing control over its business, becoming unaware of possible issues that 
affect its operational efficiency and turnover, which culminates in a variety of negative 
indicators, such as overestimated sales, large overcapacity, and high expenses. Profitability and 
financial strength thus decline as a direct consequence. Management’s dazzle and the 
company’s unbalanced growth will continue until it faces extremely critical difficulties. At that 
point, the company has little chances to survive unless an internal restructuring takes place 
(Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008). 
A similar process is also defined by Litter & Sweeting (1985) when describing a radical 
innovation procedure in a mature company. They defend that this innovation (e.g. a new 
product development) tends to be seen as part of the corporate strategy and is often highly 
supported by the chief executive and the board, at first. Yet, this procedure does not usually 
have a formal charter outlined, and the goals are not defined with precision and the actual 
procedures to be employed are hazier. When it comes to deciding on which innovation to take, 
the search for opportunities seems to be more random than systematic, and few are the attempts 
to fund business ideas from which a rational selection could be made. The evaluation and 
planning and control procedures used tend to be those employed in the mainstream business, 
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even though the more innovative nature of the new business ventures many times means that 
much of the data employed is highly questionable and tentative. Finally, the innovation process 
in a mature firm described above presents a series of factors that contribute to innovations to 
fail, decreasing the performance of the company. 
After having explained the failure process of dazzled growth companies, Ooghe & De 
Prijcker (2008) explains which factors may or may not contribute to such deterioration. 
According to the authors, issues in general environment do not affect the survival chances of 
these firms. Yet, such factor may just affect the duration of the failure process. Thus, even if a 
company’s odds of surviving an internal crisis are not affected by a change on the external 
environment, such as a recession, it may jeopardize the recovery time of the failing firm (Ooghe 
& De Prijcker, 2008). 
The immediate environment is inevitable to survive, and keeping close interactions with 
it is fundamental. Therefore, when it comes to the influence of the immediate environment, 
Ooghe & De Prijcker believe that dazzled growth companies fail because they create feelings 
of mistrust on their customers. In fact, customers of such firms may just become confused and 
doubtful about the innovations implemented by the company, which may lead them to abstain 
from buying the new items (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008).   
Considering management mistakes, they are the major cause of failures and 
performance indicators are its symptoms (Sharma & Mahajan, 1980). In what concerns dazzled 
growth companies’ managers, Ooghe & De Prijcker (2008) defends that they do not lack 
management or industry-related experience, competencies, or skills (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 
2008). Yet, these managers are usually confident and over-optimistic, living under the glory of 
past success, ignoring present signs of performance deterioration. While these types of 
managers are motivated, they can become distracted by new opportunities, seeing great 
potential in a panoply of investments, and may underestimate negative performance results. 
Sharma and Mahajan defend that failures can be predicted either by analyzing the strategic plan 
and/or its implementation or by observing performance indicators, such as profitability, 
leverage and liquidity ratios (figure 8) (Sharma & Mahajan, 1980). Thus, controlling the 
strategic plan at stake and keeping track of performance indicators, even though it is against 
the typical manager of a dazzled growth company, may soften, stop, or reverse the failure.  
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Finally, when considering the corporate policy of dazzled growth companies, Ooghe & 
De Prijcker (2008) defend that it fails majorly as a consequence of extreme gearing, which 
couples with an unadjusted managerial and operational structure. In fact, dazzled growth 
companies usually embrace strategies with over-investments and exaggerated risks. This 
failure process usually results in increased expenses and weak profitability. By the time the 
company develops its recovery plan, it has already lost financial strength and trust from the 















Research Question 2: What drives a company to diversify its product range? 
 
A company applies a diversifications strategy when it starts operating in two or more 
lines of business (Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). In such processes, if the enterprise decides 
to use its well-established brand name for the new product or product category, it is applying a 
brand extension strategy. This poses one of the most challenging decisions for a company as 
the rewards and risks can be extraordinary. Thus, companies may be interested in a 
diversification strategy for several reasons. 
According to Yamoah & Kanyandekwe (2014), diversification is an interesting solution 
for enterprises which intend to exploit economies of scope and have under-utilized resources 
or capabilities with high elimination costs, since economies of scope explore the diminishing 
unit production costs resulting from diversifying the production portfolio (Panzar & Willig, 
1981). Langlotz (2008) suggests that brand extensions allow for cost reduction when brands 
transfer the image and knowledge about the parent brand to the extensions (e.g. core image 
dimensions or general quality perceptions are generally easily transferred). Particularly, in low 
involvement products, a high degree of brand awareness can be enough to make consumers 
buy the new products. Considering this, it can be inferred that product extensions allow for 
lower product introduction costs. Coupling that to name and trademark creation costs, this 
translates into time and money savings with diminished risks of legal action in terms of 
intellectual property rights (Langlotz, 2008). 
Moreover, diversification may also be suitable when companies find their managerial 
skills to be transferrable to other markets (Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). Then, a company 
may expand into different businesses keeping the same reasoning and managerial procedures, 
which enables a more efficient expansion process. Also, Langlotz defends that brand 
extensions allow for faster market access (Langlotz, 2008). Thus, facilitated access to new 
markets and effectively leverage of managerial skills and procedures, may improve profits from 
brand extensions. 
Jaulent et al (2007) suggest brand extension is an efficient strategy for companies to 
reach new consumers and penetrate new markets, supporting that extensions allow marketers 
to serve other segments. So, when looking into financial risk, diversification may be a good 
way for companies to spread their risk into different products and markets, so that success is 
not dependent on a single bet (Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). Diversification makes it easier 
for a brand to shift its positioning, so even if one product line or market is struggling, the 
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company may leverage on others with more security and better results, and pull from or even 
abandon failing projects (Langlotz, 2008).  
Moreover, according to Aaker & Keller (1990), a brand extension may be very 
attractive to firms that face high new product failure rates, since such strategy provides a way 
to take advantage of brand name recognition and image to enter new markets. Langlotz (2008) 
supports such point of view when stating that consumers who have no personal experience or 
knowledge regarding a product's quality are likely to use brand perception as a quality 
indicator. Therefore, consumers’ knowledge about the parent brand image and name 
recognition can be leveraged to new markets, which can reduce new product failure rates, 
making extensions attractive for companies with high failure rates. All in all, leveraging strong 
brand names can substantially reduce the risk of introducing a product in a new market by 
providing consumers with the familiarity of an established brand, increasing initial sales 
volume and creating higher consumer acceptance. The advantage of applying a brand extension 
strategy goes hand in hand with the fact that companies applying a diversification strategy also 
take advantage of the possibility of cross-subsidizing one product with the surplus of another 
(Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). 
On the field of brand perceptions and equity, Balanchader defends that a company may 
feel motivated to extend its product range as extensions may favorably affect the image of the 
parent/umbrella brand, which influences sales in other categories (Balachander & Ghose, 
2003). Balanchader & Ghose support a positive spillover effect from advertising of a child on 
the choice of a parent brand. This is a particularly relevant find since these authors see little to 
no use on own advertising.  
Additionally, Broniarczyk & Alba (1994) believe that the salient attributes of the 
original brand introduce new attributes into the representation of the extensions, as people may 
draw inferences about features of the extension that previously did not exist in the extended 
product category. If these attributes are positive, the inferences about the characteristics of the 
extensions will also be positive. Also, Aaker & Keller (1990) defend that brand extensions can 
decrease the costs of distribution and/or increase the efficiency of promotional expenditures. 
Bringing it to the next level, Langlotz defends that the parent brand can benefit from a 
successful brand diversification strategy in a much broader way (Langlotz, 2008), as positive 
effects from the brand extension may be felt by both the parent brand and the extensions. When 
looking into a successful parent brand, its sales are already maximized among highly loyal 
purchasers, thus positive reciprocal effects of extensions occur especially among prior nonusers 
and non-loyal users. Among prior non-users and consumers with low to moderate brand loyalty 
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the experience of extensions can foster brand familiarity, lead to stronger brand attitudes and 
therefore change brand evaluation and increase the likelihood of purchasing the parent brand, 
eventually causing increases in market share of the parent brand. On the other hand, if the 
extension is a failure, negative reciprocal effects towards the parent brand are better absorbed 
if the parent has a very strong market position.  
 
Finally, another interesting result by Nobeoka and Cusumano (1997) states that firms 
seem to do better when they leverage core technologies and designs across multiple product 
lines, while these designs are still relatively new. In other words, not only the application of 
technology leveraging but also the speed with which firms transfer new technologies across 
multiple projects seems to have an impact on corporate performance. Keeping such findings in 
mind, to increase sales, it seems useful for firms not only to develop new designs but, at the 
same time, to leverage these new designs quickly in overlapping projects that produce new 
products. 
  
Nevertheless, not all types of diversification are the same. According to Yamoah & 
Kanyandekwe (2014), two types of diversification strategy may be pursued: related 
diversification and unrelated diversification. The first takes place when companies expand 
their operations beyond current markets and products, yet still operating within existing 
capabilities or their already existing value network. Conversely, unrelated differentiation exists 
when enterprises extend their operations into markets or products beyond current resources and 
capabilities. Aaker & Keller (1990) also defend the existence of two equal strategies on brand 
extensions, being the first the use of the brand name to enter a new market segment in its 
product class (related product diversification), and the second the use of the brand name to 
enter a completely different product class, unrelated product diversification. For the purpose of 
this study, the focus will be towards the latter. 
According to Chang & Wang (2007), a company may apply an unrelated differentiation 
strategy when it is able to provide different businesses with managerial knowledge and 
expertise that reinforces the individual business, increasing the company’s overall profits. 
Alternatively, Chang & Wang (2007) also find it suitable for a company to pursue an unrelated 
product differentiation strategy when it may reinforce the chances of increasing the strength of 
the economy of the different markets it plays in and developing competencies that may be 
shared among diverse markets and products. 
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When considering the possible benefits of applying a specifically unrelated brand 
extension strategy, such benefits are in line with the advantages of applying a general 
diversification strategy presented above. Firstly, this type of diversification allows companies 
to continue to grow after their core business has matured or at least it has started to decline. 
This goes together with the fact that unrelated product diversification may also mitigate cyclical 
fluctuations in sales revenues and cash flows (Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). By having 
more than one product to rely on, the company can allocate its resources into more promising 
products when the mature products’ lifecycle comes to an end. Langlotz supports this idea, 
defending that brand extensions allow for uncoupling product life cycle and brand life cycle, 
stating that transferring image and brand awareness of phasing-out products to successors is 
the only way to uncouple product and brand life cycle, and make the capital invested in a brand 
last longer than just the product lifetime (Langlotz, 2008). The same applies to a product 
suffering from fluctuations in sales and cash flows, so that when sales are on a low, another 
product may compensate by having its sales on a rise, and vice-versa. 
Moreover, expanding into unrelated products or markets spreads the business risk over 
different industries, allowing for financial resources to be directed to those industries offering 
best prospects, and stabilizing profits, as hard times in one industry may be compensated by 
better times in others (Yamoah & Kanyandekwe, 2014). 
 Additionally, Aaker & Keller (1990) suggest that subjects’ perceptions of the difficulty 
of making the extension have a positive relationship with the evaluation of the extensions, 
supporting the hypothesis that an extremely easy-to-make extension, on average, is less likely 
to be accepted. Consumers may attribute placing a quality brand into what is viewed as a 
trivially easy-to-make product class as an effort to capitalize on a brand name image to 
command higher than justified prices, or that it is incongruous to introduce a quality brand 
name in a trivial product class. Considering this and perceiving an unrelated product 
differentiation strategy as more difficult to apply than a related one, it can be concluded that 
unrelated brand extensions may be better accepted than related ones, as expanding into 
unrelated markets usually involves leaving the company’s comfort zone and explore non-
dominant fields. (Aaker & Keller, 1990) 
Last but not least, it may be interesting for a company to consider that unrelated 
diversifiers with high global market diversification achieve higher corporate profit growth than 
unrelated diversifiers with low global market diversification (Kim et al, 1989). Such finding 
may be regarded as an opportunity for firms which have a strong presence in the international 
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Research Question 3: How can a brand extension strategy negatively impact a company? 
 
 Having already explored the advantages of applying a brand extension strategy, it is 
now important to present its negative side. The aspects below apply for both related and 
unrelated product extensions. 
 According to Langlotz, the primary risk when applying a brand extension strategy is 
uncertainty of success (Langlotz, 2008). Indeed, both product and geographic diversification 
fuel the complexity of multinational operations (Sambharya, 1995). Moreover, companies 
facing the decision to bet on diversification are usually inserted in an atmosphere not prone to 
thoughtful deliberation, which may make it more abrupt and its results more unpredictable 
(Markides, 1997).  
According to Sambharya (1995) and Bausch & Pils (2009), product diversification is 
not profitable by itself and, per se, it will hardly influence performance. In fact, extensions per 
se rarely expand category demand and retailers cannot provide more shelf space to a category 
just because there is more product (Hardie et al, 1994). Biggadike (1979) even suggests that 
the odds for companies which aim to apply a brand extension strategy are often unattractive. 
Such strategy is not an activity for the impatient or the fainthearted. 
When considering the position that brand extension reduces costs, many are against. In 
fact, extensions carry several hidden costs (Rust R., et al, 2006). Peckham (1981) suggested a 
study by The Nielsen Company, formerly known as A.C. Neilsen, in which 115 new product 
launches in five UK and US markets were compared in terms of market share of products 
released as new brands and those released as brand extensions. The brand extensions performed 
significantly worse, which was attributed essentially to the lower levels of promotional support 
of the extensions. Obviously, firms subscribing the argument that brand extensions meant 
savings in promotional costs, to their own detriment. So, the cost saving argument does not 
appear to stand up, as in fact brand extensions performed worse and may require brands to 
incur in some hidden and unconsidered costs. Also, according to Sharp (1991), since many of 
the costs associated with brand extension are incurred in the long term, many managers who 
operate under short-run sales and profitability budgets are incapable of giving a balanced 
estimation of the overall impact of this strategy on a business. Hardie et al (1994) add to the 
idea that brand extension may have a negative impact on costs by stating that the costs of 
wanton line extensions are dangerously high, as the strategic role of each product becomes 
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muddled when a line is over-segmented. To say the least, multi-item lines are 25% to 45% 
higher than the cost of producing only the most popular item in the line (Rust et al, 2006). 
From another point of view, Jones H. defends that if a brand is stretched too far, the 
rubberband may snap and the core value of the name devalues (Jones, 1995). In fact, brand 
extensions may cause dilution of the core brand, causing negative effects on brand image, 
making it lose meaning. According to Sharp (1993), continuing on betting on brand extension 
exposes a greater range of brands to the possible spillover of negative publicity, and bad 
publicity for one brand may spill over to the other brands sharing the umbrella name. Langlotz 
(2008) additionally suggests that negative reciprocal effects may appear if the extensions fail 
to meet consumers’ expectations or are inconsistent with consumers’ feelings or attitudes 
towards brand image (Langlotz, 2008). This may harm the brand equity and lead to decreases 
in sales for some or all products offered under the brand. Furthermore, negative reciprocal 
effects also work the other way around, in the sense that the beliefs about the parent brand can 
be harmful to the extensions, as some attributes are highly valued in one product class but 
associated with low quality on other. Finally, it is important to refer that though negative 
reciprocal effects are particularly likely if the extension is a failure, they can even occur in case 
of success. The wrong extension can always create damaging associations that may be 
expensive and impossible to change (Sharp, 1991).  
When it comes to positioning, Langlotz (2008) points to the increased difficulty of 
positioning new products towards specific target segments. This risk is particularly felt in 
unrelated product extensions. Due to the high degree of brand integration, it becomes harder to 
position new products and to target them into specific customer segments. Also, the higher the 
number of product offerings under one single brand, the greater the coordination efforts, in 
particular for marketing and advertising activities (Langlotz, 2008). 
 Another diversification risk Langlotz (2008) suggests is the chance of cannibalization 
effects, when sales volumes of one or more products suffers due to the launch of an extension. 
This raises problems if losses in sales extend sales generated by the brand extension (Langlotz, 
2008). 
 Moreover, managers’ lack of expertise and knowledge about their companies when 
considering a brand extension is always a serious risk, especially when considering unrelated 
product diversification strategies (Schoar, 2002). To bet on brand extensions is a decision that 
involves an important growth trust. If the judgment is wrong, then substantial time and 
resources were lost and other market opportunities might have been missed (Aaker & Keller, 
1990). According to Schoar (2002) and Aaker and Keller (1990), a successful unrelated 
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diversification strategy is highly dependent on the manager’s ability to develop skill and 
competency at managing such strategy. Schoar (2002) defends that if this managers’ ability 
fails, coordination among activities will become highly complex, jeopardizing the possibility 
to achieve synergies and making it harder to effectively allocate resources. According to Aaker 
& Keller (1990), the success of a brand extension often relies upon assumptions made about 
consumer behavior, which are not always correct. Managers often mistakenly assume that the 
consumers hold positive beliefs and attitudes toward the original brand, many times also 
assuming that negative associations are neither transferred nor created by the brand extension, 
yet assuming positive associations with the parent brand facilitated the formation of positive 
beliefs and attitudes toward extensions (Aaker & Keller, 1990). 
So, how can a company know when to stop extending its brand? Posing this question 
inside an enterprise may be hard, since marketers create extra pressure for extensions to be 
created to serve an increasingly segmented market (Rust et al, 2006). According to Sharp 
(1991), for managers operating for the short-run, any technique which might reduce the costs 
of introducing a new product must be highly tempting, particularly during difficult economic 
times. And, if the new product is suitably close to the existing brand's image, then the associated 
advertising is likely to increase overall sales in the short-term, since using an existing brand 
name tends to induce trial (Aaker, 1990), making related product diversification an interesting 
strategy. While these factors do not guarantee long or even medium-run survival or an adequate 
return on launch and development costs, brand extension can certainly make short-run sales 
figures look impressive (Sharp, 1991). 
Yet, managers are not blind to the risks of brand extensions, and nearly 70% of them 
admit that excessive complexity is raising their costs and hindering their profit growth, 
according to a 2005 Bain survey of more than 900 global executives (Rust et al, 2006). Product 
and geographic diversification really are the fuel of the complexity of multinational operations 
(Sambharya, 1995).  
Ultimately, when companies reach overcomplexity, some indicators stand out. 
Employees struggle to adjust workflows to accommodate new product configurations, error 
rates creep up, inventories expand, and managing all these symptoms becomes so difficult and 
costly that margins shrink dramatically (Rust et al, 2006). Worst-case scenario, an 
overstretched business suffers brand dilution, when consumers lose the original grasp of brand 
perception and no longer associate the brand with a specific product (Juda). So, why would a 
company go this far? The truth is that having an over complex business, even though it is 
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common, it is also quite an invisible problem, which never comes to mind when trying to 































Research Question 4: How may a company get out of a diworsefication situation? 
Business turnaround is the reversal of failing results — sales and profits – through 
fundamental change. Schoenberg et al (2013) propose two non-exclusive types of business 
turnaround strategies. The content-orientated, which concerns the main hard objectives of the 
turnaround, namely cost efficiencies, asset retrenchment, a focus on the firm’s core activities, 
and building for the future, and process-orientated strategies, emphasizing the process itself 
to manage the change, including reinvigoration of the firm’s leadership and corporate culture 




● Cost Efficiencies: Cost efficiencies is the turnaround strategy aiming at producing quick 
results to rapidly stabilize the business. So, this strategy is usually the first step of business 
turnaround, as it is easily implemented and has an almost immediate effect, requiring little 
to no capital or resources (Schoenberg et al, 2013). This cost cut strategy is also supported 
by Dunlap & Andelman (1997), who claim that it is crucial to be extra careful about 
expenditures to improve the business situation. According to him, companies which aim at 
turning around should pinch pennies, and attack costs, the main enemies of any business. 
The most commonly reported cost efficiencies in the literature are decreasing R&D, 
collecting and reducing accounts receivable, cutting inventory, stretching accounts payable, 
reducing marketing activity and eliminating pay increases (Schoenberg et al, 2013). 
 
● Asset Retrenchment: This strategy usually comes right after the cost efficiencies. It 
consists of analyzing if underperforming areas can be made more efficient or need to be 
disinvested completely (Schoenberg et al, 2013). Retrenchment decisions are inevitably 
difficult, as there is the risk that asset sales will compromise future strategic options, while 
conversely they may be necessary to generate cash and reduce losses. Dunlap & Andelman 
(1997) support that to draw a solid business strategy, it is crucial to know in what business 
the company is playing in, so as to get rid of the assets that are not core ones and focus on 
the core like a laser. They advise to sell everything which is not in the core business 
spectrum; what is not in the core business is in what Dunlap and Andelman call the “dirty 
laundry”, to free the business of managing them, redeploying funds into the right 
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investments (Dunlap & Andelman, 1997). Rust et al (2006) also defends that the way to get 
healthy margins and a good market share is through focusing on the core product lines, 
instead of continually extending them. The suggested procedure to do this is through the 
elimination of slow-moving products so that all efforts are put into core offerings, the ones 
that account the most for sales. To do so, Rust et al proposes the study of the costs of 
producing and distributing each SKU, from the beginning to the end of the value chain. To 
do so, the company should ask itself: “What would my company look like if it made and 
sold just one product?”. After having posed this question, the company could start adding 
variety back into the business, product by product, measuring customer interest and 
incremental revenues, estimating new costs and weighting complexity. The point where 
costs start outweighing revenues is what the literature names by “innovation fulcrum”, this 
is, the number of offering that optimizes both revenues and profits. Finally, by identifying 
the innovation fulcrum, the enterprise would be able to provide precisely the right degree 
of variety and operational complexity, while also cutting and fattening margins (Rust et al, 
2006). Then, it is necessary to develop deletion plans for unprofitable items that cannot be 
restored to profitability quickly and easily. Thus, if the company bets on extending its 
product portfolio, it must be careful enough to create adjacencies that make the original 
brand more exciting and appealing (Clark, 2008).  
 
● Focus on core activities: This strategy is frequently associated with the previous one, and 
it includes determining the markets, products, and customers that have the potential to 
generate the greatest profits, refocusing the firm’s activities in these areas. For that, 
companies must focus their product portfolio in the ones the firm is best known, or in 
customer segments that are particularly loyal or less price sensitive, or even in areas where 
the firm has distinct competitive strength (Schoenberg et al, 2013). The firm may also return 
to activities for which it was well known in the past, and may also need to redesign or 
restructure itself to be aligned with its core purpose, rationing, divesting or closuring 
operations, products or assets that do not fit with this purpose (Schoenberg et al, 2013). 
Zook (2007) defends that businesses must fight back the tendency to over diffuse over new 
temptations to avoid getting lost in all the possibilities. Zook and Ormiston (2001) support 
that the loss of focus leaves the core business undefended, occupies management's time and 
spends company’s resources, and in some cases, even destroys the company’s value by 
confusing investors and damaging share price. So, Zook and Ormiston suggest that 
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companies should first look for opportunities to grow inside. Only afterwards, should 
companies bet on related business, the so-called, “adjacencies”.  
Chris Zook became such a great defender of refocus businesses, he decided to write a 
book, “Profit from the core”, where he strongly supports that growth and profits are 
unlocked not by abandon the core business, but to focus on it with renewed vigor and 
creativity. Strong businesses, many times lose their virtue due to premature abandonment 
of the core business, miscalculation, or a hurry to search new growth sources. Therefore, 
according to Zook, a management team developing or adjusting its company’s growth 
strategy must follow these steps: first, define the business boundaries and the core business; 
second, identify the differentiation factors that create market power; and, third, evaluate the 
current core to see if it is working on its full economic potential. Dunlap & Andelman 
(1997) added to that idea, by defending that businesses should ask two questions before 
deciding on which products to go for and which ones to drop: “What business are we in?” 
and “What business should we be in?”. The value of a strategically relevant product-market 
definition lies in "stretching" the company's far enough so that significant threats and 
opportunities are not missed, yet not so far as to dissipate information gathering and 
analysis efforts on "long shots." (Day, 1977).  
 
 Build for the future: This strategy usually begins when the immediate crisis has passed 
and the financial position has been stabilized, working as growth strategy from the core 
focus that was developed. The idea to build for the future is to create a solid strategy, 
for one needs to envision its future and plan on how to reach it, looking at short and 
long-term (Dunlap & Andelman, 1997). So, knowing where the company is today and 
what to do to improve it is crucial, since its analysis and consequent decisions will 
impact the long run (Sullivan and Harper, 1996). Many believe that building for the 
future involves changing with a vision that englobes all team members (Goodfellow, 
1985). So, managers need to act as leaders and understand the importance of the 









● Reinvigoration of firm leadership - This strategy involves the replacement of the 
incumbent CEO. Often, it is triggered by the realization that the firm is in serious 
difficulties and that action is urgently needed (Stopford and Baden‐Fuller, 1990). This 
action comes as a signal of change, both to the external audience and internally to the 
employees (Daily & Dalton, 1995). When it comes to external considerations, research has 
found that “the mere presence of a charismatic leader can remove doubts about the survival 
of a firm” (Flynn & Staw, 2004). Internally, the change of the leadership has a strong 
symbolic power, as it is sign that the current situation is no longer tenable, and that the firm 
is serious in its willingness to change for the turnaround to begin. The second common 
reason for the replacement of the CEO is where the incumbent appears blind to the 
existence of any problems, as their mental models fail to adapt to their firm’s changing 
environment (Schoenberg R et al, 2013). In these situations, the replacement of the CEO 
can create hopeful assumptions that the new leader’s different personal backgrounds, 
experiences, and innovative ideas will help the company turning around (Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997). Changing the top management team, along with the CEO, is often 
advocated, as also many new CEOs will bring their own trusted colleagues with them. This 
idea is also supported by Dunlap, who believes that to draw a solid business strategy, it is 
crucial to assure the right management team, relying on the best management, magnifying 
the company’s ability by surrounding it with great people (Dunlap & Andelman, 1997). 
Moreover, a number of reasons have been given to support the change of team along the 
change of the CEO. First, the existing team is believed to hold a set of beliefs on how the 
firm should be, which had to be incorrect since they had led the firm to its current position 
(Hofer, 1980). Zook & Ormiston 2001 global study also came to add to this idea, by proving 
that even the most sophisticated management teams may be mistaken when identifying 
adjacent growth opportunities. In fact, these teams may be misled by highly related 
businesses that, at the end of the day, end up having a very different cost structure and 
customer base (Zook & Ormiston, 2001). Second, senior managers may reject arguments 
that highlights they have made poor decisions in the past. Finally, different managers have 
different skills from those who drive the business to its current position (Dunlap & 
Andelmans, 1997). 
 
● Culture Change: This aspect challenges and confronts past beliefs and assumptions, which 
may no longer be relevant, and need, therefore, to be changed. Stopford and Baden-Fuller’s 
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(1990) showed that when the CEO and its team challenges past beliefs, it acts as a signal 
to employees of innovative solutions that would not have otherwise been possible (Stopford 
& Baden‐Fuller, 1990). Others have found that the culture changes are also symbolic, 
facilitating a change in the cognition and behaviors of employees, which is important for 


































LEGO’s origins bring us back to 1932. In the Danish town of Billund, there was a 
humble Carpenter named Ole Kirk Kristiansen who was inspired by his four sons to craft 
wooden toys, which would, in 1947, be transformed into plastic toys. By 1949, Kristiansen 
produced over 200 toys which he would sell by the name of LEGOs, from the Danish “leg 
godt”: play well (Mortensen, 2017). Ole would assure that his toys were perfectly 
manufactured, imposing high-quality standards which are still assured to these days (Rivkin 
and Thomke, 2012). 
Working alongside with his father since he was twelve, Ole’s third son, Godtfred Kirk 
Kristiansen, always paid close attention to every detail of the brick-manufacturing and to the 
company’s business development. He saw great potential in LEGO, as the toys were unique, 
robust, and allow long hours of pure fun. It was during Godtfred tenure that LEGO became the 
worldwide famous toy enjoyed not only by kids but also by adults. Then, the company’s profit 
margins expanded, achieving a slow and steady growth, which implied a long period of time 
for new products to be launched. However, this slow pace served the company well. In fact, 
already in the 80’s, under the early command of Ole’s grandson, Kjeld, there were even times 
in which the demand for LEGOs was so high, that executives found themselves discussing how 
to slow sales down (Rivkin & Thomke, 2012).  
LEGO and the ‘90s toy market 
LEGO’s history was not always a bed of roses. In the ‘90s, the toy’s industry suffered 
massive changes. Not only were Big-Box toy discount stores lowering prices dramatically, 
making the industry highly competitive, but they were also fiercely merchandising the biggest 
trends of the market (Ashcroft, 2013). In fact, Walt Disney Co.'s "Mighty Morphin' Power 
Rangers" (figure 9) and "The Lion King” (figure 10) toys, the ultimate market vogues, were 
backed up by J. C. Penney Co. and Kmart, both Big-Box store companies. Other trends were 
also invading the market and becoming real competitors for LEGOs, such as the Japanese 
phenomenon, Pokémon (figure 11) (AdAge, 2003).  
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Moreover, birth rates were decreasing. In the US, they moved from a rate of 1.67% in 
1990 to 1.44% in 2000 (Statista, 2018). In Europe, it decreased from 1.24% to 1.06% (Pordata, 
2018). And, children were craving for toys that offer instant gratification as their playing period 
was getting shorter. Back then, kids were growing faster than ever, maturing at an earlier age, 
losing interest in traditional toys, and shifting their interests towards the Internet, video games, 
and CD-ROMs. Facing this new demand wave, toy marketers started investing in innovative 
interactive toys, as “virtual pets”: Tamagotchi (figure 12), Neopets (figure 13), and Furby 
(figure 14) (AdAge, 2003).  
Finally, also internally, LEGO was suffering from inside the company threats, as in 
1993, Kjeld had to step back from the company during a year due to health issues (Ashcroft, 
2013) (Mortensen, 2017). 
LEGO market responses in the‘90s  
Confronted with the ‘90s threats, LEGO was committed to driving growth and covered 
all the possible untapped value. The company was not willing leave the toy industry in the 
hands of Big-Box stores. It was rather devoted to face the challenges that the new decade 
presented and embrace new projects, hoping to achieve both innovation and growth. For that 
purpose, LEGO came up with multiple brand extension strategies, such as the creation of its 
own children’s wear (figure 15), books (figure 16), movies (figure 17), and TV shows (figure 
18) (Ashcroft, 2013). Additionally, LEGO opened new Legoland parks, such as the ones in 
Windsor (figure 19) (1996) and California (figure 20) (1999). During these years, the Danish 
company came up with new initiatives to become closer to its customers. It created its own 
Imagination Centre (figure 21) (1992), new development departments, such as SPU Darwin 
(1996), a Mindstorms Learning Center (1997), and it established several Consumer Service 
Centers (1997). Furthermore, by the end of the decade, in 1999, LEGO also created its first 
online shop, LEGO World Shop, and its first LEGO products-only store in London (figure 22) 
(Mortensen T., 2017).  
LEGO also invested on overall restructuration of the group, in particular in one made 
in 1999. Besides, the ‘90s were also years of great internationalization for the brand, which the 
following countries: Malasya (1990), Japan (1992), Hungary (1992), South Africa (1993), and 
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Mexico (1994) (Mortensen T., 2017). Also, LEGO invested in multiple international shows 
and exhibitions. On top of all these investments, LEGO’s bricks were becoming more and more 
complex (Ashcroft, 2013). 
LEGO’s first fall 
In 1998, Lego felt its first financial losses, as sales were not keeping up with the 
increasing number of LEGO-branded products, and in 2000, the company lost €107 million on 
revenues of around €1.29 billion, and its global net turnover was €1.273 billion, compared to 
€1.313 billion in 1999. (Ashcroft, 2013). 
Thus, in 2001, under the tenure of Kjeld, LEGO decided to make some changes in its 
own strategy. It planned to reduce and abandon certain initiatives outside the core business, 
such as lifestyle products, Legoland parks, and software investments. The idea was to refocus 
the brand in its core products and values, while at the same time making it grow. Also, new 
items, for instance, Bionicle (figure 23), Harry Potter (figure 24), Bob the Builder (figure 25), 
and Life on Mars (figure 26) were either launched or expanded. (Ashcroft, 2013). 
By the end of 2001, LEGO was making profit again: a pre-tax profit of € 71 million 
compared to a loss of € 144 million the preceding year and a profit from primary operations of 
€ 110 million. The success resulted from an increase in sales and to significant internal changes 
in areas such as production, control, and the product range (Ashcroft, 2013). 
LEGO’s second fall  
A year later, in 2003, hopes for the company went down again. The market for 
traditional toys and games market declined in the early 2000s. Consequently, the increasing 
pressure under the traditional toy industry was forcing LEGO’s competitors to pursue a similar 
strategy to the one LEGO had bet on at the beginning of the millennium, introducing new 
trendy products. Then, retailers were already developing their own private labels. Coupling to 
that, both the Legoland parks, which were supposed to increase the brand visibility, and the 
LEGO own retail stores, supposed to strengthen the consumers’ experience, were becoming an 
expensive distraction. The results for 2003 were unsatisfactory. Net sales decreased by 26%, 
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from €1.57 billion in 2002 to € 1.1 billion. Play material sales also fell by 29% to € 967 million. 
It also suffered a pre-tax loss on earnings of €188 million, a drop of €270 million compared to 
2002. (Ashcroft, 2013). 
The focus on the end user ignored the means of access and distribution, making retailers 
overstocked with products which offered diminishing margins. LEGO inventory had increased 
by 40% at some outlets to more than twice the amount of stock considered to be acceptable. 
Overall, sales were extremely slow at the beginning of 2003. This decline was particularly 
aggressive in the USA, country in which sales dropped by almost 35% compared to 2002. 
Pairing to that, in Asia the sales faced a decline of 28%. The German market also suffered a 
reduction in its sales of 20%, and the UK, Holland, and the Nordic markets fell by 13%. These 
numbers were associated with shortfalls the sales of movie tie-in items, such as Star Wars 
(figure 27) and Harry Potter, which clearly lacked a follow through at crucial times in their life 
cycle. In fact, the drop-in sales of such products accounted for more than 50% of the overall 
sales shrinkage. (Ashcroft, 2013). 
All in all, in 2003, LEGO was reported the following way: “We are on a burning 
platform, losing money with negative cash flow and a real risk of debt default which could lead 
us to break up of the company” (Ashcroft, 2013).  
LEGO’s fresh start – Knudstorp tenure 
The year is 2014. LEGO announced remarkable results. In the financial year of 2013 
revenues increased by 10% to €3.4 billion. Profits before tax were €1.1 billion. The company’s 
operating margin was 33% before tax. LEGO achieved €3.26 billion of revenues and profits of 
€1.08 billion. Revenues have tripled in eight years, and LEGO has replaced Hasbro, and it 
became then the second largest toy company in the world, following only the giant Mattel. Ever 
since its crisis years of 2003 and 2004, LEGO increased its gross margins from 56% to 70%, 
it shrank its operating costs from 70% to 37% of turnover, and it doubled sales per employee. 
The brand’s return on equity jumped from zero to almost 70% and equity values also follow 
the pattern, by increasing from 400 million to over €1.47 billion. In 2014, LEGO would be 
worth €123.5 billion (Ashcroft, 2013). So, how did the company turn around? 
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Every cloud has a silver lining, and LEGO knew how to ride out of the storm, thanks to 
Jargen Vig Knudstorp (figure 28), who, not coincidentally, has just become the first non-family 
member Executive Chairman of LEGO’s board, in May 2017 (Bloomberg).  
 Ever since his childhood, Knudstorp had always been a fan of the LEGO bricks, and as 
he grew up, he became more aware of the company’s heritage. In fact, LEGO was a fascinating 
case to analyze for a man like Knudstorp, who not only holds a BA degree and a PhD in 
Economics, but also has served as a Management Consultant at McKinsey & Company from 
1998 to 2001. Thus, in September 2001 he joined the LEGO Group, and a year later he became 
the head of the brand’s strategy department. In November 2003, Knudstorp decided he would 
save LEGO’s from the “burning platform” the company was on, and he became Acting Chief 
Financial Officer and Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs (Bloomberg). For that 
purpose, Jargen put into practice what he had learnt at McKinsey: “Fact finding is the first step 
to problem solving” (Ashcroft, 2013).  
 By 2003, Knudstorp produced a report which would help him review the problems of 
the company. It did not take him long to conclude that his job would be to stop the bleeding, 
by stabilizing sales and cutting costs dramatically. Jargen would also have to deal with the 
excess of capacity and stock, with the undoubtedly unhappy retailers, and with the fact that 
LEGO was sitting in the wrong countries. All in all, LEGO was completely out of track, and 
did not know how out of track it had become (Ashcroft, 2013).  
To further explain the reasoning behind what was going on inside LEGO, back in 2003, 
Knudstorp took several aspects into consideration. The first was communication. It was not 
like employees or customers were unaware of the problems of the company. They just did not 
owe any lines to communicate key messages to the top of the hierarchy. Management was out 
of reach for the major customers and for many employees (Ashcroft, 2013). Moreover, the 
company was organized in the form of a matrix, in which there were twelve senior vice-
presidents in six overseeing regions, each operating in their own structures with little 
accountability and no assessment on product profitability. When taking a holistic look into the 
company, it was almost impossible to efficiently manage products, as it became extremely 
complex to know which products were making money and having an appropriate return on 
investment. While profit and loss accounts by country were widely used, there were no 
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accountability reports by products. There was no line profitability, and investments such as the 
Legoland parks were a crash drain which no one could actually justify (Ashcroft, 2013).  
On the other hand, ever since the ‘90s, LEGO feared that kids’ interest in playing with 
traditional toys had completely vanished. Consequently, the brand felt an enormous urge to 
diversify its business away from the core product, the bricks, betting on products on areas such 
as: software, learning tools, lifestyle products, girl’s toys, books, magazines, television, theme 
parks, and even its own retail stores. In the 2000’s, LEGO was developing an average of five 
adjacent businesses every year. As Knudstorp would later state: “I think we found there were 
basically two fundamental challenges that grew out of this period - overstretch and 
overexpansion. Focus had been lost on basic execution, simple things. We did not know really 
what we produced on a weekly basis. There was a lack of transparency. We did not know where 
we made money and where we lost money” (Ashcroft, 2013).  
 Faced with the 2003 challenges, how would LEGO transform its business 
performance?  
To save LEGO from the burning platform it was standing on, Knudstorp was assisted 
by “Profit from the core” (figure 29), a book by Chris Zook, partner at Bain & Company. Zook 
argued that profits arise when businesses focus on their core products and serve them to well-
defined customer segments. Additionally, Zook supported that companies could not afford too 
much diversification, as they would not be able to efficiently develop and manage adjacent 
markets. To put it in practical terms, Zook suggested that growing companies would maybe 
afford one adjacent market move every five years. Hence, Knudstorp was willing to focus on 
LEGO’s core business and go back to the bricks. Coupling to that, he would make sure that 
profitability would be a priority, in particular, the profitability of the core products, towards 
which he foresaw great potential (Ashcroft, J., 2013).  
At the end of 2003, LEGO’s strategy was to create an action plan, which would include 
a set of new initiatives. The goal of this plan would be to cut costs, restore competitiveness, 
generate cash, and ignore the rush to grow in the immediate future. This would involve 
producing the right products, the ones with which children actually play, the bricks. But 
producing them was not enough to guarantee its success. The bricks would need to be placed 
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at the right time in the right place, and its quality would have to be consistently right. In 
Knudstorp’s own words, LEGO had to go through a “process of rediscovery” (Ashcroft, 2013). 
The priority of Knudstorp was to develop an action plan to stabilize the business and 
restore execution. If this task was managed successfully, he would then focus on profitability, 
and hopefully, the company could go back to organic growth. Yet, the short-term action plan 
would mainly focus on the following points: the financial aspect of the business, the 
management of the products, and the development of the relationship with both customers and 
retailers (Ashcroft, 2013). 
When considering the financial aspect of his action plan, Knudstorp was assisted by 
Jesper Ovesen (figure 30), the then-recent Financial Director of LEGO. Ovesen, a man with 
experience in Finance did not take long to complete his analysis of the company and make 
considerable recommendations. Thus, Ovesen and Knudstorp defined as a priority the 
development of clear financial targets to rationalize product offer, control costs, and manage 
line profitability (Ashcroft, 2013).  
By 2003, Knudstorp decided to cut the product offer by 30%, and focus on selling the 
classic LEGO bricks. This decision implied a non-recurring cost of € 60 million, which was 
allocated to writing down operating assets and buildings, and redundancy payments, fruit of 
the reduction in activities (Ashcroft, 2013). By adjusting the production capacity to the reduced 
activity level, LEGO did not only cut costs, but also lowered sales.  
LEGO’s slowdown led to job cuts of 600 employees, number which then escalated to 
1000. In 2004, the company decided to shut down its factory in Lättich, Switzerland which, per 
se, resulted in a reduction of the number of staffs in approximately 100. As hard as these 
measures may seem, they truly contributed to the reduction on the cost base, as well as towards 
a satisfactory inventory situation (Ashcroft, 2013). 
Other aspect which became crucial for Knudstorp to execute his action plan related to 
the introduction of specific targets. Knudstorp was committed to manage line profitability, task 
which became easier along the reduction of the product offering. Particularly, with the help of 
Ovesen, the goal setting for control products success was the following: have a 13.5% return 
33 
 
on sales (ROS) target for all products within the LEGO portfolio. To achieve such numbers, 
there were services and products which could no longer be part of the offerings line. In fact, 
when analyzing the capital allocation and the return on capital performance, decisions such as 
dropping the Legoland theme parks, abandoning the computer sales business, and slowing 
down the LEGO stores programs, were the options to take (Ashcroft, 2013). A cut on the 
endless number of investments LEGO has engaged in the past was then conducted (figure 31). 
LEGO’s relationships with both its customers and its retailers also suffered 
modifications in 2003. In Knudstorp action plan, the key point was to put retailers at first place, 
and customers second. It was not that Knudstorp did not acknowledge the end user any 
importance. It was rather a matter of quitting the habit of developing new products every time 
a child could have an interest in a possible toy, and create the habit of caring more for retailers’ 
satisfaction. Yet, children’s interests would also be considered, using focus groups and mind 
storming. Paying more attention to the preferences of adult fans of LEGOs (AFOLS) was also 
a goal to be accomplished. Knudstorp wanted to maintain a close relationship with the end 
users of LEGO’s products, offering them the items they valued. Knudstorp was running away 
from the concept of offering as many products as possible. On the contrary, in 2003, LEGO 
was committed to focus on developing and marketing its more timeless and legendary core 
products, bricks, that were indeed the source of general great demand thanks to their ability to 
stimulate children’s creativity and intellectual activity (Ashcroft, 2013). 
LEGO Duplo was a case of an item which was successfully relaunched in the market 
in 2004 and which played an important role in the segmentation process. In fact, in 2002 LEGO 
Duplo was replaced by a new product, also oriented for pre-school children, LEGO Explore 
(figure 32), which was a failure, resulting in 37% shrink on pre-school sales in the same year. 
It did not take long for the company to realize its mistake, and relaunch Duplo, a more timeless 
product with which kids actually enjoyed playing. Additionally, products for specific segments, 
such as LEGO Friends for girls, were also kept in the market, as they were believed not only 
to be profitable, but also be valued by the customers, in particular by the young female’s 
segment (Ashcroft, 2013).  
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Overall, many were the factors which contributed to LEGO’s performance turnaround. 
LEGO’s case is nowadays a proof that even the most failing businesses may be turned around 

















Teaching Note  
Overview of the case 
 
During the early 2000s, LEGO performance was failing. Yet, it was not always that 
way. Until this period, the company’s sales, cash flows, and return on investment had always 
been increasing. Only at the beginning of the millennium did the company felt a pressure to 
grow and innovate its products and processes. Many were the causes of such pressure’s feeling. 
Firstly, the general environment of the company was changing during the ‘90s: economic 
factors were a challenge for the company which was dealing with a declining traditional toy 
industry mined with retailers and Big-Box Stores which offered more competitive prices. Also, 
technology deviated the focus of children who no longer wish to play with traditional toys, but 
rather with interactive toys, video games, or surf the internet. Foreign countries were also 
distracting LEGO. Secondly, the company’s immediate environment also played its role: there 
was an overestimation of the demand, an increase on fierce competition, and an augmentation 
of the number of unsatisfied retailers who were overstocked with LEGO’s products. Thirdly, 
LEGO’s managers, even though full of experience, competencies and skills were not taking the 
right decisions, as they underestimate negative impacts. Finally, the corporate policy of LEGO 
was dominated by exaggerated and unthoughtful risk-taking behaviors. 
During the ‘90s, LEGO was concerned with not surviving the rise of new trends and 
preferences, innovative technology, and increased competition. So, the first driver of LEGO’s 
brand extension strategy really was the pressure it felt from the external environment. But other 
aspects also fueled this decision. LEGO believed that by having more products to offer, the 
risk and dependence over the core business would be lower. Thus, even if the bricks lifecycle 
had come to an end or close to it, the company could still rely on other promising products. 
Moreover, Kjeld’s believed that the good perceptions people had of LEGO could easily be 
transferred into brand extensions, making product diversification a strategy with reduced costs. 
Kjeld also believed that the managerial skills, knowledge, and expertise the company already 
held were easily applied to other markets, facilitating and fastening the new markets’ access. 
Ultimately, Kjeld thought that the brand extension strategy would produce positive results for 
LEGO with little extra effort on the promotion and managerial procedures. On the other hand, 
LEGO was attracted by the idea of cross-subsidizing one product with the surplus of another, 
perfect solution for a company with high new product failure rates: LEGO could use the fame 
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it already had and leverage it, so that the entrance in new markets could profit from strong 
brand recognition, and the risk of product failure would not be enormous, as such failure could 
be compensated by a product on a hype. Finally, undertaking a brand extension strategy, 
particularly into unrelated product areas, might have been very appealing for LEGO, since 
often consumers perceive such strategy as a brand bravely and innovatively abandoning its 
comfort zone. 
However, brand extensions carry many risks. Firstly, LEGO suffered from the 
uncertainty of this strategy’s results, as no one was sure how it would end up. Especially, 
because this strategy was not pursued under thoughtful deliberation, but rather, out of despair 
of remaining a player in an ever-changing market. Moreover, by diversifying its product range, 
LEGO was putting into question its own brand image. And, at a certain point, LEGO was 
inserted in so many markets, it was losing control over the business and its values. LEGO was 
not aware of its product offering, nor could it engage in a proper positioning strategy. At a 
certain point, the company could not fully commit to any product, as its efforts were diffused 
among an enormous product portfolio.  
Thus, in the early 2000s, it was clear that LEGO had gone too far on extending its brand. 
The business was over complex, presenting classic symptoms of diworsefication. Employees 
were struggling with the production of new products and unable to communicate it to the top 
of the hierarchy. Forecasts, in particular, financial ones, were getting harder to perform, and 
inventory was almost impossible to manage.  
In 2003, LEGO inventory increased by 40% at some outlets to more than twice the 
amount of stock considered acceptable. LEGO’s performance was shrinking significantly 
during its crisis: net sales decreased by 26% in 2003, and in terms of margins, it suffered a pre-
tax loss on earnings of € 188 million, a drop of €269 million compared to 2002. In 2003, LEGO 
hit rock bottom: “a burning platform, losing money with negative cash flow and a real risk of 
debt default which could lead us to break up of the company”. 
To make its way out of its deep failure stage, LEGO relied on the leadership of 
Knudstorp. Knudstorp assumed his role and decided to act on the following fields: stabilizing 
sales, rationalizing the product offer, cutting costs dramatically, and ultimately restore 
competitiveness. Also, he would have to bring the focus back to a company lost under a panoply 





Students should:  
● Identify and distinguish the various deterioration/ business failure processes 
● Identify and provide examples of each of the variables that influence the failure processes 
● Identify which are the benefits of undertaking a brand extension strategy 
● Identify the risks of undertaking a brand extension strategy 
● Identify symptoms of diworsefication 
● Acknowledge the importance of keeping frequent awareness and track of business 
performance indicators 
● Learn the theory of business turnaround strategies, identifying and distinguish content and 
process-orientated strategies 
















1. In your opinion, was LEGO performance failing in early 2000? 
2. Which were the benefits for LEGO of undertaking a brand extension strategy? 
3. In which risks did LEGO incur when undertaking a brand extension strategy? 
4. Which diworsefication symptoms did LEGO present? And, how did these symptoms result 
in business failure? 












Roadmap for discussion 
The class should take approximately one hundred minutes. To improve the structure of 
the class, it is suggested that the class will be divided into five blocks of more or less twenty 
minutes each. Each block corresponds to one of the paragraphs below. 
The instructor could start the class by asking students whether they believe LEGO 
performance was failing at the beginning of the millennium. This question could be conducted 
through voting, and a short justification of the answers. Afterward, the instructor could ask to 
state in which stage of the lifecycle do they believe LEGO was in, in 2003. This question it is 
intended to spark further discussion. Then, the instructor could move on to ask students about 
what were the variables leading the company to failure. During this part, the board could be 
filled with the heading: “What influenced LEGO’s failure process?”, followed by these 
subtopics: “general environment variables; immediate environment variables; management; 
corporate policy; company’s characteristics; others”. This is the part in which the instructor 
introduces students to theory on failure processes. Finally, the instructor could ask students 
whether they see a relationship between the company’s lifecycle stage and the previously 
discussed variables. If they do, the instructor might further ask them to match it with the failure 
process LEGO was in. During this part, the instructor may intervene to explain other failure 
processes types (such as the unsuccessful start-up, the ambitious growth company, the dazzled 
growth company, and the apathetic established company). 
The class could continue with the instructor asking students about the benefits for 
LEGO of pursuing a brand extension strategy. These benefits should be written down on the 
board in such a way that it is possible to link them with the ones mentioned in the literature. 
After having discussed the benefits of brand extension strategies, the instructor could spark 
discussion by asking students if they think that brand extending was a good strategy for LEGO 
to reduce dependence on the core business. Moreover, voting could be conducted to evaluate 
if students believe that bricks lifecycle was coming to an end in 2003. The final, and ultimate 
question would be to inquire students if, in their opinion, customers perceived LEGO’s 
extensions positively. 
The class may keep running with the following question: “In which risks did LEGO 
incur when undertaking a brand extension strategy?”. The answers for this question may be 
written down on the board while the instructor introduces theory on the topics being referred. 
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Then, the instructor may conduct a voting for students to decide whether or not the extension 
strategy by LEGO was a thoughtful decision. Finally, the instructor could bring up to the table 
the topic of the pressure under which LEGO was during the ‘90s, and inquire students whether 
or not Kjeld tried to ignore the risks of extending its product line, while believing on the very 
positive perceptions people hold on LEGO and the easiness with which they could only be 
transferred to the extensions. 
The class could continue with the instructor asking students to mention some of 
LEGO’s signs of failure due to overstretched brand extensions during its early 2000s crisis. 
The instructor should try to match the symptoms identified with literature and theoretical 
background. After having identified these symptoms, the instructor may divide the class in 
smaller groups, so that each group discusses one symptom and how it affects business 
performance, ultimately leading to failure. Finally, the instructor could put the class all back 
together, to ask if LEGO was keeping track of its performance indicators in the ‘90s and 2000s. 
The purpose of this last question would be to call students’ attention to the importance of 
maintaining an open eye in business KPIs. 
The class may end with the instructor asking if students think Knudstorp had engaged 
in any business turnaround strategy when leading LEGO. This question could be responded 
through a justified vote taking, and the answers for this question may be matched with the 
literature on the field. During this part, students should display knowledge of LEGO case study 
and should provide information and examples of Knudstorp turnaround pursued tactics. 
Questioning if reducing the product offer, cutting costs, and focusing on the core business were 
all part of a good and strategy by LEGO would be interesting to encourage discussion. The 
instructor could try to keep the discussion focused on the latter (focus on the core business) 
and how the two aspects are related to this one. During this discussion, the instructor should 
try to match students’ suggestions to theory of business turnaround. Additionally, the instructor 
could make students wonder if LEGO asked itself which were the products worth keeping, and 
which ones were worth throwing away. The ultimate question would be to ask students how 
having some knowledge or past experiences on business turnaround strategies could have or 






Since each 20 minutes block of the class introduces students to different learning topics, 
the main takeaways are also divided according to this structure. Students should keep in mind 
LEGO’s case study, coupling it to knowledge prevenient from literature and theoretical 
backgrounds. 
Firstly, students should identify and explain several failure processes, which may vary 
depending on the company’s maturity stages and on its failure drivers. The drivers for a 
company lack of success, according to the literature, include the general environment, 
immediate environment, corporates characteristics, management of the company, and 
corporate policy of the enterprise. When considering LEGO, students may defend the company 
was at a rather mature stage, and that all of the above factors end up impacting negatively its 
performance, leading to failure. That is why, according to the literature, LEGO is considered a 
dazzled growth company: companies at a more mature stage of their life cycle, and whose 
failure process usually starts with an internal or external desire for growth and innovation. 
Additionally, students should also keep in mind that a brand extension strategy has 
multiple benefits, such as respond to external pressures and environment changes; reduce the 
dependence over core products; leverage the company’s image, managerial skills, and 
knowledge, and promotional activities; cross-subsidizing products; and, create an image of 
innovation and courage from the consumers’ point of view. All of these benefits were felt by 
LEGO to some extent. As for takeaways, students may acknowledge that often businesses 
under-evaluate the strength and power of their core product (such was the case of LEGO). 
Students may also remember that the fact that a company is strong in one activity, does not 
mean it will perform well in other activities. Finally, students should bear in mind that 
consumers do not always perceive big steps, such as brand extensions, as a good thing. It has 
to be managed carefully. 
Moreover, students must clearly identify the risks driven by a brand extension strategy: 
uncertainty of the outputs of the strategy, increased by unthoughtful deliberation; damaging the 
brand’s image; loss of control over the business; and too much optimism by the management. 
Again, all of these risks were embedded in LEGO’s brand extension strategy. Students may 
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also keep in mind other risks associated with brand extensions strategies, even if they do not 
fully apply to LEGO’s case study, such as cannibalization. 
Furthermore, students should bear in mind that LEGO, in 2003, was under a 
diworsefication situation. Students must be able to identify the symptoms the company was 
displaying at that time: employees struggling to adjust workflows to accommodate new product 
configurations, error rates creeping up, inventories expanding, and, margins shrinking 
dramatically. These symptoms are common signs of an overstretched company’s product line 
described in the literature. Students may link these signs with LEGO’s loss of focus on core 
activities. Generally, students must identify symptoms of a business which has failed in its 
brand extensions and its consequences and impact on the company. Finally, students may 
acknowledge deep relevance to keeping an eye in businesses KPI, so as to better manage and 
improve them. 
The instructor should end the class by reviewing the key strategies pursued by 
Knudstorp that allowed for LEGO turnaround, making it clear that LEGO actually went 
through business turnaround. Students, at this point, must be able to identify different 
turnaround strategies reported in the literature, such as cost efficiencies, asset retrenchment, 
focus on the core activities, and many others. The ones mentioned are the ones in which 
LEGO’s case study is focused, as these were the fuel for its turnaround. Students should end 
up the class feeling that the mentioned strategies, in particular focusing on the core business, 











Main Conclusions and Future Research 
Conclusion 
LEGO’s study is presented in this paper to reflect what happens to companies that go 
too far on brand extensions, entering a diworsefication situation, and then manage its way out 
of the situation.  
Many are the factors that may push companies to diversify its product offerings. The 
external environment, particularly the general and immediate environment, along with the 
management of the company and its corporate policy may lead a business to embrace new 
challenges. In LEGO’s case, the external environment of the ‘90s presented the company to a 
set of threats. There was the fear that trends and technology would replace bricks, and that big 
competitors would replace LEGO’s place on the toys’ market. Consequently, the Danish 
company decided to go after new business opportunities.  
This paper offers a view of the advantages and disadvantages of brand extensions. It 
highlights pros, such as reduced dependence of the core business, while spreading business risk 
across products; transference of the positive attributes related to the parent brand to the 
extensions; little need for promotion activities on the extensions given the strong brand 
recognition of the parent brand; possibility of cross-subsidizing products; possibility to apply 
current managerial skills, knowledge, and expertise to the extensions. It also presents the cons 
of brand extensions, such as: uncertainty of the outcomes of such strategy; the fact that a brand 
extension strategy assures no improvements on profitability or expansions on category demand; 
undermining the image of the parent brand; difficulty to find a position for the extensions; carry 
hidden and unconsidered costs; and, in particular, the loss of focus on the core business, and 
target specific segments, due to increasing states of complexity and confusion.  
Moreover, this paper presents some tipping points for readers to know how to identify 
when brand extensions become out of control, which was LEGO’s case. A company has gone 
too far on extensions when it is struggling to adjust workflows to accommodate new product 
configurations, its error rates creep up, inventories expand, and ultimately, managing all these 
symptoms becomes so difficult and costly, that margins start shrinking dramatically. At this 
point, the overstretched business is under the situation in which consumers have already lost 
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the original grasp of brand perception on their minds and no longer associate the brand with a 
specific product. 
In this paper, it is demonstrated that the Danish company reflects a case of a business 
which have seen more of the above presented disadvantages than it saw advantages. LEGO is 
the example for many companies of a brand suffering from over complexity and presenting 
classic symptoms of loss of focus and diworsefication. The company was considered messy 
and buried under a set of unprofitable projects. Employees were struggling with the production 
of new products and were unable to communicate it to the top of the hierarchy. Forecasts, 
particularly financial ones, were getting harder and harder to perform, and inventory was 
almost impossible to manage. Also, its performance was shrinking significantly during its 
crisis: “a burning platform, losing money with negative cash flow and a real risk of debt default 
which could lead us to break up of the company”. 
Interestingly, the main added value of this paper is on the solution-side of it. The turning 
around strategy, where it offers a wide range of solutions for companies to get on their feet 
again. These include content-orientated (cost efficiencies, asset retrenchment; focus on core 
activities; and, build for the future), and process-orientated strategies (reinvigoration of firm 
leadership and culture change). All of them are to some extent possible to see on LEGO’s case, 
under the tenure of Knudstorp. In fact, he did not fear cutting costs, including reducing the 
number of staffs and plants, nor getting rid of underperforming areas of a firm, such as 
Legoland theme parks and the computer sales business. By cutting on these, Knudstorp was 
engaging on a rapid solution for the almost bankruptcy stage of the company. He was focusing 
on the core business, the bricks, the uniqueness and the essence of LEGO. Knudstorp was 
building what is today LEGO’s empire. For that, he relied on a completely new leadership style 
and on a culture change, while refocusing on the core business and making it simpler and more 
organized, creating financial targets, measuring performance, redefining the relationship with 
both customers and retailers. 
May LEGO be an example of a successful business turnaround, as it is now the second 
largest toy company in the world. This paper intends not only to teach students on the power 
of business turnaround strategies even over companies which are almost bankrupt, but also to 
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Given the magnitude of LEGO’s case, and its many research possibilities, there were objects 
which were not covered in this paper. In the future, it would be interesting to study how LEGO 
is and will be responding to the constant intensification of technology. In fact, the massive use 
of technology impacts enormously consumer preferences and trends, particularly among the 
youngsters. Will the brand incur once again on past mistakes, overdiversifying its business to 
a state of diworsefication? Moreover, researchers could study how the Danish company will 
respond to globalization, and the increasing competition it carries along, since it requires 
companies worldwide to move extremely rapidly to customers’ demands. Ultimately, 
globalization pushes businesses to apply information technologies in supply chain 
collaboration, which completely changes the ways of doing business, reason why it would be 
so stimulating to study how LEGO would respond to it. Finally, it would be very thought-
provoking to study why there are extensions of LEGO that are succeeding today and, in the 
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Figure 1 – Lego Group – Profit & sales from 2004 to 2015. 
 






















Figure 2 – Lego Group – Indebtedness. 
 























































Figure 10 – The Lion King toys from the 90’s.  
 










Figure 11 – Pokémon toys from the 90’s.  
 







Figure 12 – Tamagotchi toy.  
 






































































Figure 17 – Bionicle – Mask of light – Film by Lego from 2003.  
 










Figure 18 - Galidor: Defenders of the Outer Dimension – Lego’s tv show from 2002.  
 











Figure 19 – Legoland park in Windsor.  
 







































Figure 22 – Lego products-only store in London.  
 




























Figure 23 – Lego Bionicle Toys.  
 



















































Figure 27 – Star Wars Lego toy from 2003. 
 







Figure 28 – Jargen Vig Knudstorp. 
 





















Figure 30 – Jesper Ovesen.  
 




31 – Capital Expenditures (DKK) & Capital Expenditures (as a percentage of sales). 
 







Figure 32 – Lego Explore. 
 
Retrieved from https://brickset.com/sets/theme-Explore. 
 
